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ABSTRACT
We examine the impact of state child care regulations on the supply and quality of care in child care
markets. We exploit panel data on both individual establishments and local markets to control for state,
time, and, where possible, establishment-specific fixed effects to mitigate the potential bias due to
policy endogeneity. We find that the imposition of regulations reduces the number of center-based
child care establishments, especially in lower income markets. However, such regulations increase
the quality of services provided, especially in higher income areas. Thus, there are winners and losers
















  One of the most notable and consequential recent trends in the U.S. labor force has been 
the rise of women in the labor force, especially among those with young children. In 1975, 
33.2% of mothers with children under age of 6 were employed; by 2005, this group’s 
employment rate had increased by over 25 percentage points to 58.3%.
1 This increase, among 
other factors, fueled a substantial expansion of the market for child care services. In the spring of 
2005, 7.2 million children under the age of 5 (36.9%) were in some form of non-relative care,
2 of 
which 4.6 million (23.3%) were in some form of organized child care, i.e., a day care center, a 
nursery school/preschool or a Head Start program. Among employed mothers with a child under 
5, 5.9 million of their children (52.1%) were in non-relative child care, of which 3.6 million 
(31.9%) were in an organized care facility.
3 
  The increasing utilization of nonparental child care arrangements to care for preschool 
age children has led to a policy interest in insuring the quality and safety of these market-
supplied services. Child advocates and researchers argue that there is an under-provision of 
developmentally-enriching,  high quality care services,
4 either because parents are unable to 
evaluate and/or monitor the quality of services their children receive (Naci Mocan, 2007) or they 
fail to take account of the full social benefits of exposing their preschool children to 
developmentally-enriching child care.
5 One response to this potential problem is for government 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009), Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, Report 
1018, September 2009.  
2 Non-relative child care consists of the following child care arrangements: 1) organized child care, i.e., child care 
centers, nursery schools and preschools and Head Start programs; 2) family day care homes, which is provided in 
the provider’s home; and 3) other non-relative care, i.e., babysitters, nannies, etc., which is typically provided in the 
child’s home. Children also may be cared for by relatives, including by grandparents, siblings and other relatives. 
3 U.S. Census Bureau. Who’s Minding the Kids? Child Care Arrangements: Spring 2005, Tables 1A and 1B, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/child/ppl-2005.html. 
4 Studies by Marcy Whitebook, Carollee Howes, and Deborah Philips (1989) and the Cost, Quality and Outcomes 
Team (1995) estimate that only about 15% of all child care programs provide care that truly supports a child’s 
physical, emotional and social and cognitive development. 




to regulate the market for nonparental child care services with the intended consequence of 
improving their quality. In the U.S., such regulations are almost exclusively the domain of states. 
States do not regulate the quality of child care services directly. Rather, they impose standards 
for inputs to the production of child care services that are thought to improve the level of quality 
of these services. For example, most states require licensed child care providers to limit the 
number of children per staff in a facility or classroom, to hire staff that meet certain educational 
and training requirements and/or to require facilities and staff to meet certain safety standards. 
  At issue is whether such regulations necessarily improve the well-being, or welfare, of 
young children and their parents. While the regulation of such services may improve their 
quality, there are a number of reasons why they may have unintended consequences. First, 
because states regulate inputs, rather than quality itself, the mapping between the quality of 
services and the stringency of regulations is indirect at best. Regulations can induce providers to 
engage in input substitution that leads to no, or possibly negative, effects on the quality of child 
care services (David Blau, 2003 and 2007). For example, imposing a regulation that requires 
teachers in child care centers to have college degrees may not increase the quality of services if it 
induces child care centers to use less-skilled aides and fewer teachers. Second, to the extent that 
imposing regulations actually eliminates lower quality child care services, some parents and 
children – especially those who are poor – may be “priced out” of the market for such services or 
face inadequate supplies of such services. Finally, states only regulate part of the market for 
nonparental child care services and the stringency of these regulations can vary across types of 
child care providers. While most states regulate the providers of organized child care (e.g., child 
care centers), they often impose fewer and less stringent regulations on other non-relative forms 
                                                                                                                                                             




of care (e.g., family day care homes), and typically do not regulate care provided by relatives 
(e.g., grandparents) at all. Because compliance with regulations usually is costly and can result in 
higher prices, some parents may be induced to substitute away from regulated providers so their 
children may end up in lower quality care. 
  To determine the intended and unintended consequences of the child care regulation, we 
investigate the impact of imposing minimum standards on the inputs used in production of child 
care services on supply and quality of such services. For this purpose, we have assembled a 
unique panel dataset obtained by merging child care center data from the Census of Services 
Industries (1987, 1992, and 1997) with state regulation data and information on the accreditation 
of child care centers by the National Association of Education for Young Children (NAEYC). 
The resulting data set contains detailed information on establishments, including their legal form 
of organization, tax-exempt status, revenue, payroll, employment and accreditation, as well as 
the state-level child care regulations on various aspects of the provision of child care services. 
Furthermore, we have gathered state-level data on family day care homes for the corresponding 
Census years to examine the cross-effects of center regulations on this alternative form of child 
care. 
  Ours is not the first study seeking to estimate the causal effects of child care regulations 
on the supply side of the child care market. Studies by Tasmeen Chipty and Anne Witte (1997), 
Blau (2007) and others
6 have examined the effects of state child care regulations on the input 
utilization, prices charged, wages paid and alternative measures of the quality of child care 
services. But, the data sources used in this study, and the econometric methods they allow us to 
employ, enable us to provide a more comprehensive and robust assessment of the impact of 
                                                 




regulation on the supply side of the child care market compared to the existing literature in 
several ways. First, we are able to better address the identification of the causal effects of 
regulation on the choices made by child care providers. Previous empirical investigations are 
based on cross-sectional samples of child care centers and, as a result, must rely on the variation 
in regulations across states at a point in time for identification. While there is substantial 
variation in regulations across states, they are likely to be correlated with various factors that also 
directly affect the behavior of child care establishments, such as other state policies, labor market 
conditions, and the preferences of consumers. Failure to adequately control for these 
confounding factors in estimation can produce biased estimates of the causal effects of state 
regulations. We attempt to reduce, if not eliminate, such bias by exploiting panel data on child 
care centers and local child care markets to control for state, time, and establishment-specific 
fixed effects in the empirical models we estimate. Second, we not only exploit the across-state 
and over-time variation in the stringency of existing regulations, but also differences in whether 
states impose any regulations on certain dimensions of child care center operations. This allows 
us to distinguish between the marginal effect of changes in the stringency of a standard, 
evaluated at prevailing levels of stringency, and the average effect of imposing a standard 
relative to imposing none. As has been noted in the recent treatment effects literature, these two 
effects measure different things and can have different signs.
7 Third, we investigate the indirect, 
cross effects of regulation of child care centers on family day care homes in order to assess the 
spillover and possible crowd-out effects of regulating only part of the market for child care 
services. Finally, we examine whether the impacts of the regulation of child care centers differ 
by the characteristics of local markets. In particular, we examine whether the imposition or 
                                                 
7 See James J. Heckman and Edward Vytlacil (2005) and Richard Blundell and Monica Costa Das (2009) for more 




stringency of regulations has different consequences for poorer versus wealthier markets in order 
to develop a better understanding of which consumers gain and which lose from regulating the 
provision of child care services. 
We have three sets of findings. First, the imposition and greater stringency of regulations 
of child care centers reduces the number of these centers in local markets and thereby reduces the 
availability of such services to parents. Moreover, the magnitudes of these impacts on the 
number of centers for plausible changes in regulations are not trivial. We also find no evidence 
that the day care centers that remain in business respond to these regulations by hiring more 
workers to increase their size. Taken together, these findings indicate that the imposition and 
increased stringency of these regulations reduce the availability of services in the center-based 
sector of the child care industry. Moreover, this reduction of the availability of center-based child 
care is greater in poorer markets. 
  Second, we examine how regulating child care centers affects the home-based sector of 
the child care industry. While more stringent regulations of child care centers has no effect on 
the  number of family day care homes in local markets, more stringent staff-to-child ratio 
requirements for child care centers do lead to higher revenues in family day care homes, with the 
larger increases in higher income markets. As we argue below, some or all of these higher 
revenues is the result of more children being cared for in these homes. Thus, some of the 
children who are crowded out of child care centers as a result of more stringent regulations end 
up in family day care homes, especially in higher income markets. Furthermore, this substitution 
to family day care homes is not accommodated by an increase in their staff, since the only staff 
in these homes are proprietors.
8 What are the consequences of this substitution of types of child 
                                                 
8 As we explain below, none of the family day care homes that we analyze have employees, so all of the labor is 




care for the well-being of parents and children? Based on the existing evidence (e.g., NICHD 
Early Child Care Research Network and Greg Duncan, 2003; Susanna Loeb, Margaret Bridges, 
Daphna Bassok, Bruce Fuller, and Russell Rumberger, 2007; Raquel Bernal and Michael Keane, 
2010), it appears the crowding out of children from child care centers into day care homes, or 
other types of child care for that matter, is likely to hamper the cognitive development of 
preschool children and their readiness for primary school. Furthermore, this substitution results 
in an increase of the number of preschoolers per day care home which may adversely affect 
children’s development, although no reliable evidence exists on the consequences of the latter. 
  Third, in contrast to the negative effects of more stringent regulations on the availability 
child care services in local markets, such regulations do increase the fraction of centers that are 
of sufficient quality to be accredited. We find conclusive evidence that the imposition and 
increasing stringency of state standards that regulate the labor intensiveness of child care center 
services significantly increase the rate of accreditation. It also appears that the average effect of 
imposing minimum educational requirements on child care center staff on accreditation rates is 
positive. Finally, the improvements in quality of child care services due to state regulations 
appear to accrue disproportionately to higher income markets, although these differences by 
income are not always precisely estimated. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section I frames our empirical analyses in the context of 
the theoretical literature and the particular features of the child care market. Section II discusses 
the data we use on child care establishments, state regulations, accreditation, and market 
definition. Section III describes our empirical methodology. Section IV presents our findings. 
Section V offers some concluding observations about our findings and their consistency with 




I.  Theoretical Considerations 
  To help frame our empirical investigations and findings, we briefly review the existing 
theoretical literature on the effects of regulating the quality of products on the behavior of firms 
and indicate the key differences in the child care market from the settings considered in this 
literature. 
  The theoretical literature most relevant for our work is on the effects of minimum quality 
standards and/or licensing. Hayne Leland (1979), Carl Shapiro (1986), and Benjamin Klein and 
Keith Leffler (1981) focus on the effects of minimum quality standards or licensing requirements 
in the presence of informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers. Assuming a 
competitive environment, they argue that imposing binding minimum quality standards that 
increase the marginal cost of (higher quality) products can lead to low-quality firms exiting the 
market and deterring their future entry. At the same time, the imposition of minimum quality 
standards increases, all else equal, the average quality available to consumers, thereby increasing 
their willingness to pay a higher price for these goods and services. Which of these two effects – 
the cost-of-quality effect and the quality-assurance effect – prevails depends on the availability 
of substitutes for the product, how price-sensitive consumers are with respect to the quality of 
products and the relative importance of the marginal to fixed costs of quality. 
  Consumer welfare, the distribution of quality in a market, as well as the profitability of 
firms, also is affected by the market structure. For example, Uri Ronnen (1991) and Claude 
Crampes and Abraham Hollander (1995) find that imposing more stringent minimum quality 
standards can induce quality (and possibly price) competition among sellers in markets that are 
less than perfectly competitive. That is, sellers may find it in their strategic interests to increase 
the quality of their products in response to the imposition of minimum quality standards, even 




high-quality sellers will want to produce even higher quality in order to differentiate themselves 
from firms selling lower-quality products to mitigate the degree of price competition with their 
regulated low-quality rivals. As a result, the quality of products of all firms in an industry, and 
not just those on whom the standards are binding, will increase, even if price competition 
between rivals may reduce the price of each firm’s product. As a result, consumers are better off 
and their demand for all products will increase. More recently, Paolo Garella and Emmanuel 
Petrakis (2008) have shown that this strategic, quality-increasing and consumer welfare-
increasing response to imposing minimum quality standards is sensitive to the degree of 
substitutability of products, the share of consumers in the market with limited information and 
the presence of variable costs of producing quality. 
  There are two important features of the child care market and its regulation that are not 
adequately captured in the existing theoretical literature. First, as noted above, states do not 
regulate the quality of child care services directly. Rather, they regulate the production of these 
services by imposing restrictions on the inputs used such as imposing minimum staff-to-child 
ratios for children in different age groups. Complications immediately arise from regulating 
inputs rather than quality directly as regulating inputs may distort care providers’ incentives 
concerning input use and substitution. For example, providers may hire employees who are 
lower in quality of other dimension to satisfy education requirement. With such distortion, the 
success of these regulations in increasing and maintaining the quality of care provided in the 
child care market becomes in question. In the empirical analysis below, we explicitly investigate 
what happens to the quality of child care provided in local markets subject to more stringent 
child care regulations on inputs used in the production of such services. 




options facing parents when assessing the impact of more stringent regulations on their choice of 
child care services. As noted in the Introduction, the child care market consists of two types of 
providers, child care centers and family day care homes that are subject to different regulations. 
Moreover, there are other options for the care of young children available to parents – such as the 
use of relatives or babysitters – that are not directly regulated at all. These “outside options” for 
child care services make the evaluation of welfare effects of imposing more stringent regulations 
on a subset of the providers in the child care market more complicated. For example, one might 
expect that more stringent regulations of child care centers would induce parents to move their 
children into the family day care sector. To the extent that there is capacity to absorb these 
children, evidence of reductions in available supply in the child care center sector would not 
necessarily imply any reduction of access by parents to market-based child care services. 
Moreover, the presence of these alternative forms of care is likely to influence the strategic 
response of firms in the regulated (or more highly regulated) sector in ways that are not captured 
by the above simple models. For example, more-regulated firms may want to switch to operate in 
the less regulated sector of the industry. A full exploration of how the imposition of regulations 
affects the behavior of firms and the well-being of consumers in the presence of segments of 
markets that are differentially regulated is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we do 
explore the extent to which regulations of child care centers affect the availability of child care in 
the less-regulated, loosely-structured sector of the market, family day care homes. 
II.  The Data 
  We combine several sources to create a unique panel dataset of child care centers, family 
day care homes, NAEYC accreditation, and state regulation. The main data we use on the child 




Census Bureau obtains data on all establishments in the service sector that filed federal income 
tax returns, regardless of whether they had tax liabilities. We are interested in those 
establishments listed as child care providers, preschools and Head-Start programs whose primary 
focus is the care of children under the age of five. Among these child care establishments, the 
Census Bureau distinguishes between those that are: (1) nonemployer establishments, which are 
owned by an individual and hire no employees; and (2) establishments that have an employee 
payroll with one or more employee in addition to the owner of the establishments. Child care 
centers fall into the second category of establishments, whereas family day care homes – 
providers who care for preschool age children in their homes – fall into the first category. 
Accordingly, throughout the remainder of this paper, we shall refer to the establishments with 
payrolls as child care centers and those nonemployer establishments as family day care homes. 
  Under the Research Data Center program at the U.S. Bureau of the Census, we obtained 
access to establishment-level data for all child care establishments with an employee payroll for 
the Census of Service Industries conducted in 1987, 1992 and 1997. However, due to 
confidentiality concerns about nonemployer data in the Census of Services, we were not able to 
obtain the corresponding establishment-level for nonemployer establishments.
9 Rather, as we 
describe below, we were only able to obtain data aggregated to the state level on this sector of 
the child care market.
10 We do not have data on child care provided by relatives (e.g., 
grandparents) or non-relatives that care for children in the child’s home (e.g., babysitters and 
                                                 
9 In contrast to information obtained for establishments with an employee payroll, all of the information obtained on 
nonemployer establishments comes from tax returns collected and “owned” by the U.S. Internal Revenue Services 
(IRS). We were not granted access to the establishment-level data for the latter type of establishments. 
10 Thus, our data on family day care homes is for those proprietors who reported business income on the 1040 
Schedule C of their individual/family returns or filed as a business entity with the Internal Revenue Service. It is 
possible that some of these homes did not comply with the federal tax code and, thus, may not be included in the 
data we use. However, we note that proprietors of family day care homes do have an incentive to file in order to 





A.  Child Care Centers and Child Care Markets 
  As noted, our primary analysis is of establishment-level data for all child care 
establishments with an employee payroll, i.e., child care centers, from the Census of Services in 
1987, 1992 and 1997. For each of these establishments, we were given access in a secure site run 
by the Census Bureau to the following information: (a) Establishment identifiers, which we used 
to match establishments over time and determine the chain-status of an establishment.
11 (b) 
Street address and business names for each establishment, which we used to organize our data 
into local geographic markets, link in data on various characteristics of these markets, and to link 
in a measure of the quality of the child care services described below from an external source. (c) 
Characteristics of these establishments and their operation, including the legal form of 
organization, tax-exempt status, operating receipts and revenues, operating expenses, number of 
employees, payroll, ownership, etc. 
  Child care markets are very localized markets. Few parents will travel more than fifteen 
miles to send their children to day care (Chipty, 1995; Sandra Hofferth, April Brayfield, Sharon 
Deich, and Pamela Holcomb, 1991). For most of the results presented below, we use zip codes as 
our measure of local markets. Based on the 2000 population Census, a typical zip code covers a 
radius of 3 to 4 miles, roughly consistent with the area that a child care center could cover. In 
order to assess the robustness of our findings based on our preferred zip-code market definition, 
we conducted all of our analyses using other definitions of local markets, including zip-code 
                                                 
11 We define multiple establishments sharing the same IRS-generated establishment identification number (EIN) in 
the same Census year as affiliated with a chain. A chain has as few as 2 establishments and as many as around 1,000 






  Finally, in order to characterize differences in the populations residing in our local child 
care markets, especially families with younger children, we used data from the 1990 and 2000 
Censuses of Population to construct market-level measures of the demographic characteristics, 
including ethnic mix, median income of the local population; the percentage of population living 
in rural areas; the number of children under age 5; indicators of the typical household 
composition (e.g., the average number of people in a household and whether it is female-
headed), labor market conditions (e.g., the percentage of females over 16 not working and the 
local unemployment rate), and indicators of commuting patterns (the percentage of the working 
population over 16 working at home and spending more than 40 minutes commuting).
13 We 
include these variables as regressors in our establishment- and market-level analyses presented 
below. 
  After merging the data on child care centers across the three Censuses, we ended up with 
a panel dataset with approximately 150,000 establishment-year observations. We also organized 
our data into local markets under the alternative definitions noted above. Based on the zip-code 
definition, we had approximately 10,000 markets for each of the three years of the Censuses of 
Services. Using the data from these surveys, we constructed a number of different outcomes and 
characteristics of these centers at both the establishment and market levels. We provide summary 
statistics for the resulting establishment- and market-level data in Tables 1 through 5. 
  In Table 1 we summarize various characteristics of child care center establishment. There 
are several notable patterns. First, the number of child care establishments has dramatically 
                                                 
12 We form zip-code bundles as the geographic areas encompassed by a zip code and all its neighboring zip codes 
within a 5-mile (or 10-mile) radius of the zip-code’s population centroid. 
13 The 1990 Census of Population is merged into the 1987 and 1992 Census of Services, and the 2000 Census of 




increased over the decade we analyze, rising from 40,628 in 1987 to 51,299 in 1992 to 61,882 in 
1997, which is a rise of 26% between 1987 and 1992 and 21% from 1992 to 1997. Second, with 
respect to the type of local organization, child care centers in 1987 were most likely to be 
organized as a corporation (49.2%), followed by an sole proprietorship (30.7%), a partnership 
(4.0%), and the remaining establishments having had some other legal structure, including being 
a government entity (16.1%). Over the period, there was a slight increase in the percentage of 
child care centers that were incorporated, largely at the expenses of partnerships. In 1987, a little 
over one-third of centers were tax-exempt, not-for-profit entities, although the incidence of this 
status declines over time. About 18% of centers were a part of a chain in 1987 and this rate 
grows slightly to 21.5% by 1997. Third, despite the rise in centers organized as corporations, it is 
clear that these establishments are small businesses as they have a relatively small number of 
employees as well as modest payrolls and revenue. A typical child care center hires 8 to 10 
employees depending on the year, paying around $10,000 salary per employee and generating 
less than $25,000 revenue per employee. At the same time, all three of these dimensions of 
centers increased over the period we examine. 
  In Tables 2 and 3, we provide summary statistics for child care markets, using zip-codes 
as the measure of local markets. In 1987, child care centers operated in roughly one third of all 
30,000 U.S zip codes, and by 1997 in roughly half of these zip codes. On average, three to four 
child care establishments operate per zip code, about two of which have entered in the last five 
years, and one to two of which will exit in the next five years. For every 1000 children under 5 
years of age, there are approximately 7 child care establishments in 1987, 8 in 1992 and 9 in 
1992. Given the average numbers of employees an establishment hires (8 to 10) and the 




over the three Census years, it is straightforward to figure out that these establishments do have 
the capacity of accommodate a significant portion of children under 5. For example, in 1997 
about 40 child care center employees in a typical zip code have the capacity of taking care of 
around 300 children, which account for about 25% of population under 5. In Table 3 we provide 
summary statistics for the demographics of the zip codes in which child care establishments 
operate from the 1990 and 2000 Census of Population. They tend to be more heavily populated, 
wealthier, better-educated, and less-rural zip codes than the average U.S. zip code. 
B.  Quality of Child Care Services: NAEYC Accreditation 
  A key feature of our study is to examine the effects of regulation on the quality of child 
care services available to parents. There is a growing consensus among child developmental 
specialists that a good measure of whether a child care center provides high-quality services is 
whether it is accredited.
14 The National Association of Education for Young Children (NAEYC) 
has administered a national accreditation system for almost two decades. Any early childhood 
program—child care center, preschool, kindergarten, or before- and/or after-school program—
can voluntarily apply for NAEYC accreditation. The applying program must submit extensive 
information about its program and undergo a site-visit to validate the accuracy of this 
information. This includes assessments of the nature and extent of interactions among teachers 
and children, a center’s curriculum, relationships between teachers and families, staff 
qualifications and professional development, the quality of a center’s administration, center 
staffing and the extent of staff turnover, a center’s physical environment, whether a center meets 
various health and safety standards, and the quality of the nutrition and food services it provides. 
                                                 
14 The 1988 National Child Care Staffing Study (Whitebook, Howes, and Philips 1989) found that accredited child 
care centers provided higher-than-average-quality services to children and Mo Xiao (forthcoming) found that 
parents were willing to pay a premium for the accredited centers, especially newly opened centers that had not yet 




As a final step, this information is reviewed by a national commission of recognized experts in 
child care and early childhood education to determine whether a center meets NAEYC’s criteria 
for a high quality child care program. If so, the commission accredits the center for a three-year 
period. In 1997, the last year in our data, around 6,500 programs were accredited. As we shall 
see below, this is a fairly small fraction of all child care centers, reflecting the fact that only very 
high quality programs are able to comply with the NAEYC’s standards. 
  We obtained administrative accreditation records from the NAEYC, which contain 
information on the accreditation status of individual child care providers over the period 1987-
97. These records included information on the provider’s exact address (street address, city, 
county, state, zip) and information on their accreditation history (application date, initial 
accreditation date, expiration date, and accreditation status). We used this address information to 
determine the accreditation status of establishments in the Census of Services data in 1987, 1992 
and 1997. We also used the NAEYC data to measure the fraction of child care center 
establishments that are accredited, or accreditation rates, by year for each of our local markets. 
  Accreditation rates at the establishment and market levels are recorded at Table 4. There 
is a substantial discrepancy in these rates, with accreditation rates based on establishment data 
substantially lower than those measured at the zip-code/market level. This discrepancy is a result 
of the lower rates of matching at the establishment level between the establishments in the 
Census of Services data and the NAEYC accreditation database. The latter was done using the 
addresses and names of establishments in the two data sets. In all three Census years, we only 
match approximately 60% of the NAEYC accredited establishments with Census establishments. 
If there is no match, we assume that the Census establishment was not accredited, which may be 




have changed their addresses and business names during our sample period.
15 In contrast, the 
market-level accreditation rates were obtained by dividing the number of accredited 
establishments in the NAEYC data located in the geographical market, i.e., within a particular 
zip-code, by the number of child care center establishments from the Census data in that market. 
While also potentially subject to misclassification error, this latter set of rates only required 
matching on the geographical unit of the market, e.g., zip codes and, we suspect, are less subject 
to measurement/classification error. Focusing on the latter rates in Table 4, we find a sizeable 
increase in accreditation rates over time. While only 0.8% of child care establishments were 
NAEYC accredited in 1987, 3.8% were accredited in 1992 and 9.4% in 1997. Still, only a small 
proportion of establishments have received accreditation, which partially reflects the fact that the 
accreditation status serves as an indicator of high-end child care services. 
C.  Family Day Care Homes 
  Given the structure of the child care industry, it is important to assess whether regulation 
of child care centers leads to changes in the number of children cared for in family day care 
homes that comprise the less-organized sector of this industry. As noted earlier, we have more 
limited data for family day care homes – which the Census of Services classifies as nonemployer 
establishments – than we have for day care centers. In particular, we only have state-level data 
on these providers, including number of providers in a state in a given year and the total revenues 
these providers received for their services as claimed on their tax returns. We also do not have 
comparable measures of the quality of their services as we have for child care centers as NAEYC 
does not accredit family day care homes. Nonetheless, we are able to analyze the spillover 
effects of child care center regulations on several aspects of the operations in family day care 
                                                 
15 The Censuses of Services records the addresses and the business names in 1987, 1992, and 1997 respectively, 





  We present, in Table 5, descriptive statistics for family day care home establishments for 
the years 1987, 1992 and 1992. As one can see, there are a large number of these establishments. 
In 1997, there were on average 9,583 family day care homes per state or 488,734 in the nation as 
a whole, with family day care homes making up 89% of all child care establishments in our data. 
We note that there appears to have been a large increase in the number of family day care homes 
between 1987 and 1992. While there may have been a dramatic growth of family day care homes 
between these two years, it is more likely that the 1987 number is the result of an undercount in 
these establishments. It turns out that 1987 was the first year in which nonemployer 
establishments were included in the Census of Services. Data from these establishments are 
obtained solely from federal tax returns and a substantial number of family day care homes were 
misclassified in terms of their industrial code in this initial year.
16 We deal with this potential 
undercount in our empirical analyses of the effects of child care regulations by dropping 1987 
nonemployer data for robustness check in our nonemployer regressions. Finally, we note that 
compared to child care centers, the average annual revenues of a family day care home is 
relatively low ($9,382 in 1997), indicative of the fact that these establishments are truly small 
businesses. As the SIPP estimated that on average $68 per week was paid per preschooler to 
family day care homes in 1997 (Smith, 2002), which amount to about $3,000 per year, the 
average annual revenues of a family day care home suggests that a typical owner takes care of 
about 3 children. 
D.  State Child Care Center Regulations 
  In this section, we briefly describe the regulation of the child care industry and the data 
                                                 





we use to measure these regulations. Which aspects of a center’s operation are regulated, and the 
stringency of those regulations, differs by types of child care provider. One set of regulations 
applies to center-based care provided in day care centers, preschool and/or nursery schools and 
Head Start programs. A different set applies to family day care homes, i.e., care provided by a 
provider, typically in their own home. Given that the primary focus of this paper is on the 
provision of center-based care, we limit our discussion to the regulation of this sector of the child 
care market. 
  In the analysis presented below, we focus on the effects of state regulations of the labor 
intensiveness (e.g., maximum child-to-staff ratios and group sizes by age group) and staff 
qualifications (e.g., minimum educational requirements and requiring criminal background 
checks for child care workers) of child care center services.
17 Previous studies have found that 
these two aspects of the production of child care services appear to be associated with objective 
measures of child care quality, such as the cognitive, emotional and social development of young 
children.
18 However, even within these categories of regulations, states tend to impose different 
standards for the care of children of different ages. Furthermore, as Blau (2003) points out and 
Currie and Hotz (2004) confirm, many of these regulations are highly correlated with one other. 
For example, states which impose stringent requirements on child-staff ratios also tend to restrict 
group sizes, i.e., the total number of children in a particular child care setting. This correlation 
makes it difficult to identify separate effects of individual regulations. Accordingly, we use two 
                                                 
17 Other requirements include requiring use of a developmental curriculum, carrying liability insurance, and meeting 
certain health and safety standards such as immunization and fire-safety equipment. Some states even specify the 
frequency of government inspections on licensed child care centers. 
18 Ruopp, Travers, Glantz and Coelen (1979) and Mocan, Margaret Burchinal, John Morris, and Suzanne Helburn 
(1995) find evidence that more labor intensive and better qualified child care staff improve the development of 
young children. Also see Cheryl Hayes, John Palmer and Martha Zaslow (1990) and Blau and Currie (2006) for 
summaries of these and other studies. An important exception to these findings is Blau (2000). He finds, using the 
same data as in the Mocan, Burchinal, Morris, and Helburn (1995) study, that only educational qualifications have 




alternative strategies to characterize state regulations. Under one strategy, we make use of sets of 
representative standards for labor intensity and staff qualifications, such as staff-child ratio 
requirements for infants and the education requirement for directors since most states regulate 
these dimensions and they differ across states.
19 This strategy is used by Chipty and Witte 
(1997), Blau (2007) and Currie and Hotz (2004). Following Blau (2003), we also construct 
summary indices of the stringency of state standards for labor intensiveness and staff educational 
qualifications. In particular, for staff-child ratio requirements, we average the requirements for 
the six age groupings and, for staff qualifications, we use the average of the number of years of 
schooling required for center directors and teachers. 
  Table 6 presents summary statistics for the minimum staff-to-child ratios for child care 
centers and educational requirements for center directors and teachers in 1987, 1992, and 1997.
20 
On the surface, there are no discernable trends in the various measures of regulation amongst 
those states that had regulations. However, one does see an increase in the number of states that 
began to regulate certain aspects of the production of child care services over this period. For 
example, between 1987 and 1997 five states started regulating staff-child ratios for infants and 4 
states changed its regulatory stringency and ten states went from no regulation on directors’ 
education levels to having a regulation. More generally, as shown in the last column of Table 6, a 
sizeable number of states changed their individual regulations over this period. This variation – 
i.e., where states changed particular regulations over our sample period – will turn out to be 
essential for our ability to identify the causal effects of these regulations on the availability and 
quality of child care services. We also note that there is considerable variation in the stringency 
                                                 
19 The staff-child ratio requirements for toddlers and preschoolers have comparable variation in data, but labor 
intensiveness matter the most for infants. 
20 The information on state child care regulations was gathered by Hotz, in collaboration with Rebecca Kilburn of 




of regulations across states. Some states (e.g. Maryland, Kansas, and California) require one staff 
member to take care of no more than 3 or 4 toddlers, while other states (e.g. South Carolina, 
Idaho) allow one staff member to take care of as many as 8 to 12 toddlers. As for the education 
requirements, states range from imposing no educational requirements on any child care center 
employees (e.g., Florida, Idaho) to requiring that directors have high-school diplomas (e.g., 
Connecticut, Michigan), to requiring that child care center directors and teachers have some 
college education (e.g. South Dakota, New Jersey). 
III.  Econometric Methods 
  In this section, we briefly outline our estimation strategy and describe the alternative 
measures of the effects of regulation. 
  As we noted in the introduction, there is a potential for bias in the estimation of the causal 
effects of regulation stringency on the child care market. The most challenging source of such 
bias is “policy endogeneity” (Timothy Besley and Anne Case, 2000), i.e., the possibility that 
state policies are influenced by (or correlated with) unobserved state-level factors or conditions 
that influence the behavioral outcomes under investigation. For example, suppose some states 
may have a high proportion of parents who prefer to provide their children with high quality 
child care – and are willing to pay for it – while the parents in other states do not. Furthermore, 
suppose that parents vote their preferences and either support or oppose the imposition and 
stringency of regulations as a way to promote higher quality child care. Then failure to control 
for the potentially unobserved differences in the distribution of tastes across states – as well as 
other differences across states and over time – will result in biased estimates of the effects of 
policy on the outcomes of interest. 




our data. First, we control for as rich a set of observable establishment- and market-level 
characteristics that might account for this source of bias in the regression analyses presented 
below. Second, we exploit our panel data on establishments and local markets to control for 
state, time, and, where possible, establishment fixed effects in these regression models. Including 
establishment fixed effects in these models not only controls for time-invariant state-specific 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity – none of the child care establishments in our data are 
observed to relocate across state lines – but also controls for time-invariant establishment-level 
factors that could cause bias in our estimates of the effects of regulations. More precisely, for 
market-level analyses we can estimate regressions of the following form: 
(1)  01 2 5 , mst st st mst t s mst Y REG NoREG X               
where Ymst are outcomes of interest for market m in state s in year t, REGst is a vector of the child 
care regulations in that state as of year t, NoREGst is a vector of dummy variables that equal 1 if 
the state did not mandate a particular regulation in year t and equal to 0 otherwise, Xmst is a 
vector of market-level population characteristics and economic conditions, t, and s, are, 
respectively, year and state fixed effects, and 1 is the vector of the impacts of state child care 
regulations on Ymst. And, for establishment-level analyses, we can estimate the following 
regression models: 
(2)  01 2 5 6 , jmst st st mst jmst t s j jmst Y REG NoREG X Z v               
where Yjmst are outcomes for establishment (child care center) j located at local market m within 
state  s in year t,  Zjmst denotes a vector of establishment characteristics, ωt,  s and j are, 




state child care regulations on Yjmst.
21 In order to examine how the effects of regulations differ 
across the population of consumers (parents), we also estimate the following variants of (1) and 
(2): 
(1) 
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where  Cmst denotes characteristics of the populations of local markets and we use median 
household income as such a characteristic in this study. 
  The inclusion of state and establishment fixed effects implies that our effects of 
regulations are identified holding constant any time-invariant differences across markets in (1) 
and any time-invariant differences across establishments in (2).
22 The inclusion of year fixed 
effects implies that we also hold constant any shocks which hit all the states in the same year. 
Our data allow us to support a richer set of strategies to mitigate policy endogeneity bias than 
any previous attempts to estimate the effects of regulations on the availability or quality of child 
care services.
23 
  The specifications in the above regression models allow us to estimate two alternative 
and distinct effects of regulations on Ymst and Yjmst. The coefficients 1 and 1 in (1) and (2), 
respectively, measure the marginal effect of a change in the stringency of an existing standard, 
                                                 
21 Controlling for firm, rather than establishment fixed effects – multiple establishments can belong to the same firm 
– produced results that were similar to those reported below. 
22 The extent to which there are other, unobserved market-level factors that are time-varying and correlated with our 
regulation variables, our results still may be biased. 
23 Both Chipty and Witte (1997) and Blau (2007) use cross-sectional data to identify the effects of regulations on the 
supply and quality of child care services. For example, Blau (2007) uses a detailed cross-sectional sample of child 
care centers surveyed in four states and uses within state variation in differences in regulations by age groups of 




REG, given that this dimension of child care is regulated.
24 This causal effect considered in 
previous studies of child care services. But, as suggested by the theoretical work on the effects of 
regulations discussed in Section I, one is often interested in the effect of imposing some standard 
relative to no standard at all. This latter effect corresponds to average treatment effects 
considered in the evaluation literature. In particular, let Y1 denote the potential outcome when a 
state regulates a particular dimension of child care centers and Y0 denote the potential outcome 
when it does not. Then, the average effect of regulation is defined to be 
(3)  
12
10 ** * *
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where θi = i in (1) and i in (2) and 
**
ii     in (1) and 
*
i   in (2). Below, we present estimates 
of the average effect of a regulation at its sample mean, i.e., R R   . 
  It is important to note that the marginal effect and average effect of regulation 
characterize two different effects of regulation and, in general, they need not be of the same sign. 
The regression specifications above allow for this possibility. For example, it follows from (3) 
that the average effect of imposing any regulation, evaluated at certain level of regulation,  , R   is 
positive, even though the marginal effect of a change in that level is negative. 
  Finally, we estimate the variance matrix taking into account unobserved heterogeneity 
influencing seller behavior at the state-year level in all sets of regressions. Specifically, we allow 
the error terms to cluster by state-year group, that is, we allow each state-year group to have a 
different and unrestricted covariance structure but assume that errors are uncorrelated across 
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groups (Brent Moulton, 1986).
25 
IV.  Results 
  Tables 7 through 12 present results on the effects of state child care regulations on the 
supply and quality of child care services. To keep the size of these tables manageable, we only 
report the coefficients on our regulation variables and their interactions with the median 
household income in the local markets.
26 For every table, we include two panels: the upper panel 
(Panel A) presents estimates of the effects of specific regulations, i.e., those for the minimum 
staff-child ratio requirement for infants in day care centers and educational requirements for 
center directors. The bottom panel (Panel B) presents estimated effects of the stringency indices 
on minimum staff-child ratio and educational requirements that we described in Section II. 
  We begin by making some general observations about our empirical findings. First, we 
consistently find that the estimated effects of regulations (marginal effects and average treatment 
effects) that control for time, state and/or establishment fixed effects are markedly different from 
those that do not. For example, the estimated effects results often switch signs – including from 
negative and significant to positive and significant – when we control for fixed effects. 
Furthermore, unlike in Blau (2007), we do not find that controlling for fixed effects 
systematically render the estimated effects of regulations to be statistically insignificant. Rather, 
for many outcomes, regulations do significantly affect firm behavior, even after we control for 
various sets of these fixed effects. Second, the signs and statistical significance of the effects of 
regulations on firm and market-level outcomes are not very sensitive to whether we use direct 
                                                 
25 If we cluster error terms by state instead of state-year pair, we lose significance in a few cases but our inferences 
about the effects of regulations remain largely intact. 
26 In all of our regressions, we control for the variables listed in the top part of Table 1 and in Table 3. Versions of 





measures of regulations or the stringency indices we constructed. Nor are our results on the 
effects of minimum staff-child ratios or staff educational requirements sensitive to whether we 
hold constant measures of regulations on other dimensions of the production of child care 
services or whether we control for indicators of whether a state actually imposed any regulatory 
restriction. Finally, the signs and statistical significance of the effects of regulations on the 
outcomes we exam are robust to the particular way we define local markets, i.e., whether they 
are defined local markets as zip codes, zip code bundles, or counties. To conserve on space, we 
do not report on all of the robustness checks we performed. Detailed results for these analyses 
are available upon request. 
A.  Effects of Regulations on the Number of Child Care Centers in Local Markets 
  As we noted in Section I, one cannot sign the effects of the imposition of regulatory 
standards or of increasing their stringency on the production of child care services. They depend 
on the balance between the increased costs centers face of complying with regulations and the 
increased willingness of consumers to pay higher prices for care because of their increased 
assurance of the quality of services. Moreover, the fact that inputs, rather than quality, are 
regulated implies that the mapping between the quality of services and the stringency of 
regulations is not as direct as suggested by the theoretical literature on minimum quality 
standards. In this section, we examine estimates of the net effect of these forces on the supply of 
child care services as measured by the number of establishments per local market. 
  Table 7 presents results on the effects of state child care regulations on the number of 
child care centers in a local market, using zip codes to define these markets. The regressions both 
without and with state and time fixed effects (column 4) show that the average effect of imposing 




(estimates in “Ave. Effect of Regulation” rows) and the marginal effect of increasing the 
stringency of this standard significantly reduce the number of establishments operating in a local 
market, although the average effect of the minimum staff-child ratio regulation is not statistically 
significant. To get a sense of how sizeable this effect is, consider the marginal effect of 
increasing the minimum staff-child ratio from its mean of 0.226 (see Table 6) to 0.292, which 
amounts to reducing the average maximum number of infants per staff member in a child care 
center by 1 infant.
27 Based on the estimates from Panel A, column 4 of Table 7, such an increase 
in the stringency of the staff-child ratio for infants would reduce the number of child care centers 
in the average market by between 9.2% and 10.8% depending on the year analyzed. Meanwhile, 
the marginal effect of increasing the average required number of years of education of center 
directors by 1 would reduce the number of child care centers in the average market by between 
3.2% and 3.8% depending on the year analyzed. While not huge, the marginal effects are not 
trivial reductions in the availability of child care centers. 
  The estimated effects of child care regulations on the availability of child care centers in 
Table 7 are not uniform across different markets. In column 5 of Table 7, we provide estimates 
of the interaction of the various regulations with the median household income in the local 
markets. As one can see, the interactions of the staff-child ratios in both Panels A and B are 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the positive coefficient on the interactions of these ratios 
with the median income of households in the local markets are positive, indicating that the effect 
of increases in the stringency of minimum staff-child ratios is larger in wealthier markets. At the 
                                                 
27 The average of the minimum staff-child ratio for infants is 0.226 (Table 6), which corresponds to a maximum 
child-staff ratio of 4.425. Thus, reducing the number of infants per staff member by one implies that the associated 
minimum staff-child ratio would be 0.292 (= 1/[4.425 – 1]). Thus, the minimum staff-child ratio would increase by 
0.066 (= 0.292 – 0.226). Then the estimated reduction in the number of centers in an average local market would be 
-0.371 (= -5.6170.066),) corresponding to 9.2% (= 0.371/4.023) of average number of child care centers in a zip 




same time, the interactions of median income with minimum educational requirements in either 
Panel A or B are not statistically significant and tend to be small, indicating that there is little 
evidence that the effects of this latter set of regulations vary by the income of households in local 
markets. 
  To provide a better sense of how the impacts of the marginal and average effects of 
regulations vary by the median household income of local markets, we present, in column 1 of 
Table 8, the implied estimates of both the marginal and average effect of regulations for local 
markets with higher median income markets (evaluated at 2 standard deviations above the 
sample median) and for lower income markets (evaluated at two standard deviations below the 
sample median). With respect to these effects, the negative impacts of the imposition of 
minimum staff-child ratios (“Ave. Eff.” column) and increasing their stringency (“Marg. Eff.” 
column) are concentrated in poorer markets. In fact, based on our points of evaluation, the 
imposition of minimum staff-ratios or increasing their stringency actually increase the number of 
child care centers (establishments) in higher income markets. One possible explanation for this 
difference is that wealthier households may respond to tighter standards by increasing their 
demand for child care center services consistent with the dominance of the quality-assurance 
effect suggested by some of the theoretical models discussed in Section I. In contrast, markets 
with poorer households may be more affected by the increase costs that result from such 
regulations, i.e., the cost-of-quality effects dominate any quality-assurance effects of the 
imposition or tightening of minimum staff-child ratios in this sector. We will provide more 
evidence below on the plausibility of this explanation when we look at the differential effects of 
regulation by household income on our measure of quality (accreditation) and on the costs (labor 




  As we noted above, we estimated a number of alternative specifications of our baseline 
model to determine the robustness of our findings concerning the marginal and average effects of 
regulations on all of our outcomes. In Table 9 we present a few of these robustness checks for 
the number of establishments per market. Comparing the estimates of the marginal and average 
effects of regulation in Table 9 with those in Table 7, we see that across changes in our measures 
of regulations, whether or not we control for other state regulations and using alternative 
definitions of local markets, we consistently find negative and statistically significant effects of 
more stringent staff-child ratios on the number of child care centers per market. With respect to 
imposing minimum educational requirements for child care center staff or increasing their 
stringency, while the estimated effects are less consistently statistically significant, the estimated 
effects are almost always negative in sign. 
  Overall, we find consistent evidence that the imposition of and tightening of minimum 
staff-child ratios lead to a reduction in the availability of child care centers in local markets. Our 
findings with respect to the effects of minimum educational requirements on the supply of 
centers to local markets are somewhat less consistent in that statistical significance varies by 
which type of effect one considers and somewhat by household income. Nonetheless, we do find 
rather consistent evidence that, on average, imposing minimum requirements on the educational 
qualifications of center staff reduces the availability of centers in local markets.
28 
B.  Effects of Regulations on the Size of Centers 
  The previous section established that the imposition and increased stringency of child 
care regulations reduce the number of child care centers available in local markets. However, 
                                                 
28 We also examined the effects of state child care regulations on the market rates of entry and exit to determine 
whether the negative effects of such regulations on the number of establishments per market is the result of 
regulations forestalling entry or increasing the rate at which incumbent centers leave the market. We find evidence 




these findings do not imply that the capacity of center services in these markets is necessarily 
reduced, since the remaining providers could increase the labor they use, and thus the size of 
their operations, in response to changing regulations and possibly completely offset the loss of 
centers. More generally as noted by Blau (2007), child care centers may adjust their labor inputs 
in response to changes in these regulations, regardless of whether such responses increase or 
decrease the production of child care services. Accordingly, we directly examine the effects of 
the stringency of state child regulations on the number of employees per child care establishment 
using establishment-level data. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10. While we 
do find significant effects of regulations when we do not control for establishment fixed effects 
(columns 1 and 2), none of these effects are statistically insignificant once these fixed effects are 
included in the regressions (columns 3 and 4). The latter findings suggest that the centers that 
remain in business do not fully comply with states’ minimum staff-child ratios or that these 
centers end up reducing the number of children they cared for. Our data do not allow us to sort 
out these alternatives, since we do not have information on the number of children enrolled in a 
child care center. But, taken together with our evidence that the number of establishments 
decline as a result of the imposition of and increased stringency of state regulations, these 
findings do point to the conclusion that such changes in regulations reduce the supply of center-
based child care services in local markets. 
C.  Effects of Center Regulations on Family Day Care Homes 
  As we noted in Section I, the imposition and increased stringency of regulation of child 
care centers may increase the demand for non-center-based child care services, including those 
provided in family day care homes, to the extent that such regulations either increase the price of 




on whether this “crowding in” to family day care homes occurs and assess its likely 
consequences for the well-being of children and their parents. Recall that we only have state-
level data on family day care homes. Thus, our analysis of the cross-sector effects of child care 
center regulations is more restricted relative to that for child care centers. Nonetheless, we think 
they are informative. 
  In Table 11 and column 2 of Table 8, we present estimates of the marginal and average 
effects of state child care center regulations
29 on the number of family day care homes 
(nonemployer establishments) per 1000 children under age 5 in a state to determine how child 
care center regulations affect the supply of family day care homes. We also present estimates of 
effects of regulations on the average annual revenues per family day care home. In addition to 
being of direct interest, we argue below that any cross-sector effects of child care center 
regulations on the revenues of family day care homes is likely to track changes in the number of 
children (or child hours) in these homes. Finally, the data used to generate the estimates in Table 
11 include the 1987 data, the year for which there appears to be an undercount of family day care 
homes. However, our findings and inferences about the effects of regulations on either of the 
family day care home outcomes are little affected by excluding the 1987 data. 
  With respect to the effects of state child care center regulations on the number of family 
day care homes relative to the number of preschool age children (columns 1 and 2 in Table 11), 
there is little evidence of any cross-regulation effects as almost all of the estimated coefficients 
are statistically insignificant. Moreover, the average effects of imposing minimum staff-child 
ratios and educational attainment on child care centers employees are negative in all but one 
case, implying, if anything, that the imposition of child care center regulations reduced the 
                                                 
29 We also estimated versions of the regression models that also included measures of states’ regulations that apply 
to family day care homes. Controlling for these additional variables has little impact on the estimates and 




number of family day care homes in states.
30 However, we find positive and statistically 
significant estimate of average and marginal effects of regulating center-based staff-child ratios 
on the average annual revenue per family day care homes (Table 11, columns 3 and 4). 
Furthermore, while the marginal effect of increasing the stringency of the educational 
requirements of center directors is negative, the average effect of this regulation is positive, 
consistent with those for center-based minimum staff-child ratios. Finally, we find that the 
average effect of regulating the center-based staff-child ratios varies by a market’s median 
household income (Table 11, column 4), with such regulations resulting in higher revenues per 
establishment in higher income markets relative to poorer ones. In fact, our estimates imply that 
revenues actually fall in very poor markets as a result of tighter regulation of center-based care 
(Table 9, column 2). 
  What do these results for the cross-effects of regulations imply for the well-being of 
children and their parents? Although the number of family day care homes does not increase in 
response to tighter regulation of the center-based sector, it does appear that there is an increase 
the number of children per home. The latter is an implication of the cross-regulation effects on 
family day care home revenues. While more stringent center-based regulations may result in an 
increase in the prices charged by family day care homes, some or all of the estimated increase in 
the revenues in these homes is the result of an increase in the number of children that they serve 
and/or children-hours they provide.
31 In principle, this accommodation of children by family day 
care homes that are crowded out of center-based care due to the regulation-induced reduction of 
                                                 
30 Given this lack of statistical significance, we do not present how the estimated regulation effects differ by 
household income in Table 8. 
31 In fact, one would expect the increase in the quantity of care provided to be greater than an increase in its price, 
since the relatively low costs of establishing a family day care home are likely to keep this sector of the child care 




capacity in the latter sector should help meet the child care demands of parents, especially 
employed mothers. 
  At the same time, there are several reasons to conclude that crowding children out of 
center-based care and into family day care homes may have adverse consequences for their 
development. First, a number of recent studies (NICHD Early Child Care Research Network and 
Duncan, 2003; Loeb, Bridges, Bassok, Fuller and Rumberger, 2007; Bernal and Keane, 2010)
32 
have found that children in center-based care, especially between the ages of 3 and 4, have 
higher levels of cognitive and language skill development and school readiness by the age of 5 
than do children who spend an equivalent amount of time in family day care homes of 
comparable quality. In fact, these studies consistently find positive differential effects of child 
care centers relative to other child care arrangements, including that provided by babysitters, 
nannies and relatives. Furthermore, several of these studies find that the developmental benefits 
of center-based care are typically greater for children in poor and/or minority families. Second, 
as noted above, our estimated cross-effects of regulation on family day care home revenues 
imply that additional children cared for in these homes are cared for by the same number of staff, 
which also could adversely affect the development and school readiness of young children. 
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any evidence on the effects of differences in the 
number of children per provider within family day care homes on measured outcomes of 
children. 
                                                 
32 Blau and Currie (2006) and Duncan and Christina Gibson-Davis (2006) argue that many, if not most, studies of 
the effects of alternative types of child care and their quality on children’s cognitive development, school readiness 
and related outcomes are not based on random assignment of these arrangements, and, as such are potentially subject 
to selection bias. While there are no studies, to our knowledge, that have used random assignment to identify the 
differential effects of alternative child chare arrangements on children‘s outcomes, the studies cited above do 




D.  Effects of Regulations on Quality of Child Care Centers 
  We next examine whether child care regulations achieve their goal of increasing the 
quality of child care services. Existing theories of regulation suggest that whether regulation 
promotes the quality of child care services depends on whether the quality-assurance effects of 
such regulations outweigh the greater costs of producing higher quality services. Furthermore, as 
noted by Blau (2003), the fact that child care regulations affect the inputs used in the production 
of quality, and not quality itself, implies that imposing or tightening regulations could induce the 
substitution of other inputs and have little or no effect on quality. Finally, the models of Ronnen 
(1991) and others suggest that imposing or tightening minimum standards on quality can induce 
quality competition in markets that are less than perfectly competitive. In the analysis that 
follows, we are unable to explicitly test the validity of these alternative avenues through which 
child care regulations affect the quality of center-based care. Rather, we focus on the average and 
marginal effects of regulation on the quality of center-based care in local markets. 
  We present, in Table 12, estimates of the average and marginal effects of child care 
regulations on the percentage of child care centers in local markets that are accredited by 
NAEYC, i.e., market accreditation rates. As we noted in Section II, it appears that the rates of 
accreditation based on establishment-level data are understated due to the difficulties of 
matching child care centers in the NAEYC accreditation database with establishments in the 
Census of Services data. We argued that market-based accreditation rates were less susceptible to 
this understatement, given that such matches only required matching on zip codes and not full 
addresses. While only reported in the on-line appendix, we also estimated the effects of 
regulation on the probability of child care centers accredited using establishment-level data. In 




same as those presented in Table 12.
33 
  We find that the imposition of and increased stringency of minimum staff-child ratio 
requirements significantly increase the rates of accreditation in local markets. We also find that 
the marginal effects for both of our measures of minimum educational requirements for child 
care center staff in Panels A and B are negative, although the marginal effect of our average 
measure of these requirements (Panel B) are not statistically significant. Furthermore, our 
estimates of the average effects of these regulations are either positive or negative but are not 
statistically significant. Thus, our evidence indicates that the imposition of either type of 
regulation increases the quality of center-based care available in local markets. This is consistent 
with the quality-assurance effect dominating the cost-of-quality effect among typical consumers 
and with the regulation of these inputs actually improving the quality of child care. It is also 
consistent with Ronnen’s prediction that imposing minimum quality standards will not only 
reduce the provision of low-quality services, but also will generate strategic increases in the 
quality provided by already high-quality centers. Recall that attaining NAEYC accreditation 
requires a center to meet a set of minimum standards for its operation that are well above the 
minimum standards imposed by any state. 
  Finally, based on the estimates of coefficients on the interactions of the regulations with 
the median household income in Table 12, we find that any increases in the quality of center-
based care that result from the imposition of these regulations only accrue to high income 
markets (Table 8, column 3), although the interactions with income are only statistically 
significant for the average minimum educational requirements measure in Panel B of Table 12. 
In fact, the effect of imposing these standards on quality is consistently negative in very poor 
                                                 
33 The only notable differences between the latter results and those reported in Table 12 are for the coefficients on 
the minimum educational requirements variables, where there were differences in levels of statistical significance 




local markets. The latter findings suggest that any quality-assurance effects of imposing 
regulations are swamped by the effects of the higher costs of quality among the poor. 
V.  Conclusions 
  Imposing regulations on quality of inputs or directly on quality has an extensive history 
in a number of sectors of the economy,
34 including the market for child care services. However, 
the imposition of minimum quality standards on inputs used in production of child care services 
is only one of many regulatory responses to such market failure.
35 In the face of these alternative 
responses, policy makers need to be fully informed of the consequences – intended or unintended 
– of such regulations. 
  Based on our findings, these consequences for the well-being of children and their 
parents appear to be both positive and negative. On the negative side, we find that the imposition 
of input regulations in the center-based sector of the child care market significantly reduces the 
number of operating child care centers, especially in lower-income markets. Furthermore, this 
loss of capacity in the center-based sector due to regulation is not offset by child care centers 
hiring more workers or by expanding the number of home day care providers. Rather, our 
evidence suggests that regulating child care centers leads to more children going into the same 
number of family day care homes, where these arrangements are thought to be less 
developmentally enriching. But, on the positive side, the imposition and increased stringency of 
                                                 
34 For example, the government subjects automobile manufacturers to fuel-economy standards, and older cars to 
smog checks to ensure that they meet certain emission standards. Health care professionals, and apropos of this 
study, child care providers, must pass detailed licensing requirements in order to practice their occupations. Several 
rationales are often used to justify such governmental regulations, including informational asymmetries between 
sellers and consumers (George Akerlof, 1970) or negative externalities that the consumption of low-quality products 
or services may impose on society. The latter two situations can lead to market failure, i.e., insufficient quantities of 
higher quality products or services are produced and consumed relative to what is socially optimal. 
35 For example, another regulatory response could be to require sellers to disclose the quality of their products or 




such standards, especially on the labor intensiveness of child care centers, do increase the quality 
services available in the centers that remain. Unfortunately, this increased quality is not shared 
equally by all children and parents, since the gains appear to accrue primarily to those living in 
higher income areas. Taken together, our results suggest that a simple characterization of 
whether the well-being of children (and their parents) is improved or reduced by regulations is 
not possible and would be misleading. Rather, there are positive and negative consequences of 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Child Care Center Establishments 
 









Corporation  Whether the establishment is owned by a 








Individual  Whether the establishment is owned as a sole 








Partnership  Whether the establishment is owned by a 








Tax Exempt  Whether all or part of the income of the 
establishment is exempt from federal income 








Chain  Whether the establishment belongs to a chain: = 1 








Part Year  Whether the establishment operates less than 6 























































N  Number  of  Establishments  40,628 51,299 61,882  52.3% 
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, in Tables 2 through 6, standard deviations are reported in parentheses and sample sizes are reported in brackets for variables with 




Table 2: Market-Level Characteristics of Center-based Child Care 
(Markets Defined as Zip Codes) 
 






No. of Establishments  Number of child care establishments in a zip code  3.440  3.734  4.023 
    (3.320) (3.522) (3.864) 
Establishment Density  No. of Establishments / No. of Children under 5  0.007  0.008  0.009 
    (0.049) (0.075) (0.047) 
No. of Child Care Employees  Number of child care employees in a zip code  30.152  34.207  40.705 
    (40.914) (46.062) (55.873) 
No. of Entrants  Number of establishments which do not exist at t - 5  n.a.  1.942  1.942 
     (2.108)  (2.144) 
Entry Rate
1  No. of Entrants at t / No. of Establishments at t – 5  n.a.  0.691  0.661 
     (0.802)  (0.744) 
No. of Exits  Number of establishments which do not exist at t  +  5 1.330 1.423 n.a. 
   (1.617)  (1.695)   
Exit Rate
1  No. of Entrants at t / No. of Establishments at t  0.383 0.378 n.a. 
   (0.364)  (0.356)   
N  Number of Zip Codes  11,404  13,304  14,966 





Table 3: Demographic Characteristics of Child Care Markets  
 




Population under 5  Population under age 5 (in thousands)  1.191  1.136 
   (1.199)  (1.197) 
% Black  % Population that are African American   0.096  0.101 
   (0.176)  (0.180) 
% Hispanic  % Population that are Hispanics   0.059  0.082 
   (0.126)  (0.147) 
Household Size  Average household size  2.731  2.585 
   (0.406)  (0.345) 
Median Income  Household median income (in 1000s of 1997$)  31.060  43.674 
   (12.656)  (17.259) 
% College   % Population over age 25 with some college education  0.307  0.352 
   (0.109)  (0.104) 
% Female Head with Child  % Female-headed households with children.  0.058  0.066 
   (0.037)  (0.036) 
% Female Not Working  % Female over age 16 not working  0.379  0.370 
   (0.092)  (0.085) 
% Unemployed  % Labor force that are unemployed  0.062  0.057 
   (0.037)  (0.042) 
% Work at Home  % Working population over age 16 working at home   0.036  0.037 
   (0.035)  (0.027) 
% Long Commute  %  Working population over age 16 spending more than 40   0.282  0.322 
   minutes  commuting  (0.138)  (0.141) 
% Rural  % Population living in rural areas  0.405  0.381 
   (0.414)  (0.403) 




Table 4: Accreditation of Child Care Center Establishments 
 







Establishments:       
Accredit
1  Whether the establishment is NAEYC accredited:  







N  Number  of  Establishments  40,628 51,299 61,882 
       
Zip Code Markets:     
No. of Accredited  Number of establishments which are NAEYC 













N   Number of Zip Codes  11,404  13,304  14,966 







Table 5: Characteristics of Family Day Care Home (Nonemployer) Establishments at the State Level 
 






Number of Family Home Establishments (1000s) per State  4.351  9.589  9.583 
  (4.281) (8.956) (9.354) 
Number of Family Home Establishments per 1,000 Children under Age 5  16.595  34.927  33.259 
  (12.011) (19.811) (18.759) 
Annual Revenue (in 1000s of 1997$) per Family Home Establishment  $8.240  $7.753  $9.382 
  (1.567) (1.689) (1.921) 




Table 6: Summary Statistics for State Child Care Center Regulations by Year  
 






















Regulations on Labor Intensiveness: Minimum Staff-child Ratio by Age of Children 
 0 - 11 months  0.225  5  0.226  0  0.229  0  0.226  9 
 11 - 23 months  0.192  5  0.190  0  0.192  0  0.192  10 
 24 - 35 months  0.138  4  0.137  0  0.138  0  0.137  11 
 36 - 47 months  0.096  4  0.095  0  0.095  0  0.095  8 
 48 - 59 months  0.082  4  0.081  0  0.082  0  0.082  6 
 60+months  0.072  4  0.068  0  0.068  0  0.069  9 
                
Average   0.133  4  0.133  0  0.134  0  0.133  18 
Regulations on Staff Qualifications: Min. Educational Requirement (in years of schooling) by Type of Staff 
For Directors  13.625  15  13.644  6  13.739  5  13.673  15 
For Teachers  12.464  23  12.600  16  12.595  14  12.560  12 
                
Average   11.660  15  11.467  5  11.681  4  11.599  19 









  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: The Effects of Single Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants
  -3.519*** -3.297*** -1.898  -5.617***  -11.693*** 
  No Standard Imposed
3  -1.024**  -0.690* -0.629* -1.202**  -2.306*** 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants × Median Income              0.276*** 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income              0.047** 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio
1  0.229 -0.055  0.200 -0.067 -0.139 
Min. Educ. Requirement, Directors  -0.055  -0.051  -0.210***  -0.129***  0.062 
  No Standard Imposed
3 -0.113  0.044  -3.069***  -1.501**  1.859 
Min. Educ. Require., Directors × Median Income              -0.002 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income              -0.052** 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement
1  -0.639 -0.741  0.198 -0.263 -0.248 
R
2  0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46 
Panel B: The Effects of Averaged Measures of Child Care Center Regulations   
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio  -8.017***  -7.059***  -5.226  -6.771  -19.992*** 
  No Standards Imposed
3  -0.764**  -0.433 -0.301 -0.424 -2.217*** 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio × Median Income              0.501*** 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income              0.053** 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio
1  -0.302 -0.506 -0.394 -0.477 -0.020 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement  -0.051**  -0.044**  -0.010  -0.019  -0.015 
  No Standards Imposed
3  -0.348 -0.099 -0.515**  -0.119  0.835 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement × Median Income              -0.0004 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income              -0.030* 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement
1 -0.244  -0.411  0.399  -0.101  -0.230 
R
2  0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46 
Year  Fixed  Effects  No Yes No Yes Yes 
State  Fixed  Effects  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations  39,674 
Unit of Observations  Zip code 
1 The Ave. Effect of Regulation is the effect of imposing a regulation, at the mean value of the standard (see corresponding values in the “Mean” 
column for “All Years”) relative to no standard at all. See Section III for a description of how these effects were calculated. Estimates in italics are 
statistically significant, based on significance of coefficients on regulation  median household income interactions. 
2 The dummy variable is equal to 1 if a state imposed no standard for any of the regulations used to form the average measure and equal to 0 otherwise. 





Table 8: Differences in Estimated Marginal and Average Effects of State Regulations by Median Income of Local Market 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 





















Panel A: The Effects of Single Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Min.  Staff-Child  Ratio,  Infants       
  2 Std. Dev. above Median  3.829 0.528  29.356  5.672  0.610 0.018 
  2 Std. Dev. below Median  -10.135 -0.250  2.374  -4.274  0.712 -0.009 
Min. Educ. Require., 
Directors 
    
  
  2 Std. Dev. above Median  -0.050 0.375  -0.203 -0.059  -0.018  0.041 
  2 Std. Dev. below Median  0.051 -0.872 -0.456 0.125  -0.013  -0.0001
Panel B: The Effects of Averaged Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio           
  2 Std. Dev. above Median  8.185 0.325  47.266  9.653  1.698 0.058 
  2 Std. Dev. below Median  -17.163 -0.365 -5.180  -6.789  1.800 -0.021 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement           
  2 Std. Dev. above Median  -0.038 0.407 0.052 0.286 -0.0003 0.001 
  2 Std. Dev. below Median  -0.017 -0.867 -0.050 -0.078  -0.005 -0.009 
Based on Estimates in:  Table 7, Col. (5)  Table 11, Col. (4)  Table 12, Col. (2) 
Note: Estimates in italics are statistically significant, based on significance of coefficients on regulation  





Table 9: Estimated Effects of State Regulations on the Number of Child Care Center Establishments per Market: Robustness Checks 
 
  Alternative Variable Specifications   Alternative Market Definitions 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: The Effects of Single Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants  -6.216***     -5.998***  -37.945***  -44.980*** -41.984** -153.375*** 
  No Standard Imposed  -0.921*     -1.102**    -6.221***  -9.435***  -7.887**  -14.943* 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants × Median  Income            0.388*    1.120 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income             0.148    9.761 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio  -0.484    -0.254    -2.355  -2.597  -1.601  -2.746 
Min. Educ. Requirement, Directors    -0.128***  -0.193**    -0.464  -0.566  -1.447**  3.717*** 
 No  Standard  Imposed    -1.485***  -2.123**    -6.403  -6.972  -18.521*  0.114 
Min. Educ. Require., Directors × Median Income             0.006     -0.063 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income             0.057     -0.614 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement    -0.265  -0.516    0.059 0.008  -1.264 -2.103 
R
2  0.46 0.46 0.46    0.68 0.68 0.87 0.87 
Panel B: The Effects of Averaged Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio  -8.750*     -12.120*   -39.198  -41.049 -16.978  -146.223*** 
  No Standards Imposed
  -0.561     -0.626    -1.803  -7.728**  0.660  -14.390** 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio × Median Income             0.332    -0.056 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income             0.247***    6.503 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio  -0.603    -0.986    -3.410  -4.008  -2.918  -0.932 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement    -0.033  -0.044    -0.338*  -0.438**  -0.337  5.198*** 
  No Standards Imposed
   -0.123  -0.249    -3.636*  -1.706  -2.488  0.558* 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement × Median Income             0.002     -0.008 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income             -0.071     -0.350 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement    -0.260 -0.261   -0.284  -0.460  -1.421  -0.806 
R
2  0.46 0.46 0.46    0.68 0.68 0.87 0.87 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Including Additional Regulations  No  No  Yes    No  No  No  No 
Unit of Observations  Zip code    Zip code bundle  County 




Table 10: Estimated Effects of State Regulations on Number of Employees per Child Care Center 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Panel A: The Effects of Single Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants  -2.725  10.992***  1.842  5.552 
  No Standard Imposed  1.074  4.106**  0.069  -0.680 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants × Median Income     -0.395***     -0.054 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income     -0.103**     0.038 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio  -1.690  -1.183  0.347 0.329 
Min. Educ. Requirement, Directors  0.219**  0.280*  0.172  -0.064 
  No Standard Imposed  2.308*  4.032*  2.737  0.117 
Min. Educ. Require., Directors × Median Income     -0.003     0.006 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income     -0.073*     0.064 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement  0.686  0.819  -0.385 -0.415 
R
2  0.10 0.10  0.05 0.05 
Panel B: The Effects of Averaged Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio  -5.791  19.386**  -9.161  -5.068 
  No Standards Imposed
  0.290 3.891*  -1.506  -0.882 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio × Median Income     -0.736***     -0.136 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income     -0.126**     -0.020 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio  -1.060  -0.414  0.288 0.269 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement  0.022  0.037  -0.026  -0.075 
  No Standards Imposed
  -0.156 1.073  0.004  -0.615 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement × Median Income     -0.001     0.001 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income     -0.046*     0.018 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement  0.411 0.456  -0.306  -0.460 
R
2  0.10 0.10  0.05 0.05 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
State  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Establishment Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Unit of Observations  Establishment 




Table 11: Estimated Effects of State Regulations on the Family Home Day Care (Nonemployer) Sector 
 
Dependent Variables 
Number of Nonemployer 
Establishments  
per 1,000 Children  
under Age 5   
Annual Revenue 
(in millions of 1997$) 
per Nonemployer  
Establishment 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Panel A: The Effects of Single Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants  40.76  -36.717    27.028***  -0.690 
  No Standard Imposed  13.293  -10.940    5.894***  5.247** 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants × Median Income     2.891*       0.533** 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income     0.887       -0.076 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio  -4.081 -4.615   0.214  0.699 
Min. Educ. Requirement, Directors  -1.976*  -4.144    -0.445***  -0.485 
  No Standard Imposed  -27.476  -53.699    -6.006***  -6.777 
Min. Educ. Require., Directors × Median Income     0.072     0.005 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income     0.894     0.072 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement  0.458  -0.152   0.078  0.033 
R
2  0.96 0.96    0.93 0.94 
Panel B: The Effects of Averaged Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio  38.847  -156.298    23.838***  -11.135 
  No Standards Imposed
  5.842 14.897    3.637**  7.175*** 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio × Median Income     6.242**       1.036** 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income     -0.519       -0.187*** 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio  -0.675  6.221   0.467  1.432 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement  -0.224  -0.903    0.056  -0.061 
  No Standards Imposed
  0.327 -14.060    0.595  -0.588 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement × Median Income     0.017     0.002 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income     0.423     0.016 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement  -2.925 -3.428    0.055  0.104 
R
2  0.96 0.96    0.92 0.94 
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
State  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
         
Unit of Observations  State    State 




Table 12: Estimated Effects of State Regulations on the Accreditation of Child Care 
Centers 
 
Dependent Variables  Market Accreditation Rate 
 (1)  (2) 
Panel A: The Effects of Single Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants  0.639***  0.723*** 
  No Standard Imposed  0.139***  0.176*** 
Min. Staff-Child Ratio, Infants × Median Income     -0.002 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income     -0.001 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio  0.005  0.004 
Min. Educ. Requirement, Directors  -0.017**  -0.013 
  No Standard Imposed  -0.244***  -0.173 
Min. Educ. Require., Directors × Median Income     -0.0001 
  No Standard Imposed × Median Income     -0.002 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement  0.012  0.020 
R
2  0.09 0.09 
Panel B: The Effects of Averaged Measures of Child Care Center Regulations 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio  1.735***  1.811*** 
  No Standards Imposed
  0.208*** 0.224*** 
Ave. Min. Staff-Child Ratio × Median Income     -0.002 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income     -0.001 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Staff-Child Ratio  0.023  0.040 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement  -0.003  -0.006*** 
  No Standards Imposed
  -0.029 -0.060** 
Ave. Min. Educ. Requirement × Median Income     0.0001*** 
  No Standards Imposed × Median Income     0.001* 
Ave. Effect of Regulation, Min. Educ. Requirement  -0.006  0.004 
R
2  0.09 0.09 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
    
Unit of Observations  Zip Code 
Number of Observations  39,674  39,674 
 